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In Begriffsschrift Frege proposed to ignore the part of content that is
irrelevant to logic; what remains he called ‘conceptual content’. In ‘On
sense and reference’ he renamed this ‘sense’ but failed to stress that it is a
notion belonging to the philosophy of logic, not of language. Russell seems
to have seen the importance of the notion only briefly. Wittgenstein did
not make use of the notion until he was in Norway, and only introduced the
terminology of ‘sign’ and ‘symbol’ to mark the distinction while composing
the Tractatus. Ramsey proposed to treat sign and symbol as merely
two different ways of typing token inscriptions, but this unduly brushes
over the difficulties the notion of a symbol involves. The most striking
feature of Wittgenstein’s thinking on this is the way that he generalized
Frege’s argument for the notion of sense so as to bypass his incorrect
particularization to the case of identity.
This essay has the same title as the talk I gave in Kirchberg, but its scope is
more limited. I began that talk by remarking that the technical notion of a
symbol played in the Tractatus an analogous role to the one that conceptual
content had played in Begriffsschrift and sense in Frege’s later semantics, namely
that of singling out the part of the content of a sign that is relevant to logic.
I intended this remark as little more than throat-clearing—an uncontroversial
observation that would help my audience to situate the argument I then went
on to lay out—but during the question period it was met with consternation. I
therefore think it best to devote my written contribution to explaining what I
meant by the remark, since until I do that no one is likely to be convinced by
an argument that treats it as an obvious background assumption.
1 Begriffsschrift
In the first few sections of Begriffsschrift Frege made several important logical
distinctions. Right at the beginning, for example, he distinguished between a
judgment and its content. He was not, of course, the first philosopher to make
this distinction, but he was, as far as I know, the first to do it for the reason—
dubbed the ‘Frege point’ by Geach [4]—that it is required to explain how in the
course of a logical argument a single content may occur unasserted and asserted
in different occurrences. Even so, to make such a distinction between judgment
1
and content is not yet to say anything illuminating about the nature of the
latter. An important step—arguably the most important in all his philosophy
of logic—came when he singled out what he called conceptual content—the part
of content that is relevant to inference. Two sentences have the same conceptual
content just in case the same inferences may be drawn from each. He called the
conceptual content of a declarative sentence a ‘judgable content’. The part of
the content that this notion of conceptual content excludes he variously called
‘colouring’ (Farbung), ‘illumination’ (Beleuchtung), or ‘scent’ (Duft); in English
Dummett [1] called it ‘tone’. In Begriffsschrift Frege instanced ‘and’ and ‘but’ as
words differing only in tone, not conceptual content; elsewhere he cited various
other examples, such as ‘horse’ and ‘steed’, or ‘dog’ and ‘cur’. The fact that he
never settled on a single word for tone is symptomatic of his lack of interest in
it: he only ever mentioned it in order to set it aside as irrelevant to logic.
The importance of this distinction is that it enabled Frege to make prominent
those features of the structure of sentences that are relevant to inference. It is
part of the logician’s task, as of the grammarian’s, to study how sentences reveal
the structure of the contents they express, but their differing interests lead to
different conceptions of that structure. The two sentences ‘The Greeks defeated
the Persians at Plataea’ and ‘The Persians were defeated by the Greeks at
Plataea’ have the same conceptual content, because the same consequences may
be derived from each, whereas grammar quite properly distinguishes between
the active voice of the verb in the former and the passive voice in the latter. The
notion of tone is thus applicable not only to the contents of individual words
but to the manner in which they are assembled to form sentences: sentences
with the same conceptual content may differ in emphasis, and hence in tone, by
having different terms as their grammatical subjects.
As is familiar, Frege later realized that his Begriffsschrift notion of conceptual
content was inadequate and should be replaced. The important point to note
here is that the notion he replaced it with, ‘sense’, was still intended to play the
role of constituting the part of content that is relevant to logic. Unfortunately,
though, this point is obscured by a significant oddity in the way ‘On sense and
reference’ is written, namely that he chose hardly to mention formal logic there
at all. Why not? The only reason I can think of is that he was continuing, as
he had in Grundlagen to separate the formal from the philosophical in order to
increase the chances of being read. At any rate, he deliberately emphasized the
non-mathematical applications of his semantic theory and therefore obscured the
point that his notion of sense was primarily a contribution to the philosophy
of logic, not of language. It is uncontentious that there is some difference in
content between ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’: what is at issue in ‘On sense and
reference’ is whether logic should recognize it.
2 Russell
I have stressed the importance of the notion of conceptual content or sense for
Frege’s philosophy of logic. To see how important it was, we have only to look
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to the salutary example of Russell. He learned his quantificational logic from
Peano, not Frege, and his first reaction to φxxψx (what we would now write as
∀x(φx→ ψx)) was that this was plainly a different proposition from ‘every φ is
a ψ. He took it to be obvious that the former says something about everything
there is (namely that it is either a ψ or not a φ), whereas the latter only says
something about φs [8, §41]. This is an instance—the Principles has many others
scattered through it—of his failure to grasp Frege’s insight that logicians should
ignore the part of content that is irrelevant to inference. The result was that
Russell kept treating as logical what were really only grammatical distinctions,
and hence devising theories of hopelessly unnecessary complexity.
Not until the autumn of 1902, with the main text of the Principles complete,
did Russell settle down to study Frege’s published papers and write an appendix
to his book that summarized them. Over the next two or three years the in-
fluence of his reading of Frege was occasionally visible in his own work. For
instance, one feature of his 1905 paper that often goes unnoticed is the extent
to which Russell’s famous theory of descriptions depends on accepting some-
thing like the Fregean conception. It is one of the curiosities of ‘On denoting’
that it slips in this crucial step in a footnote, where, somewhat oddly, Russell
attributes it to Bradley [7, p. 481]. The importance of focussing on the part
of content that is relevant to inference is not the only thing in ‘On denoting’
that might have a Fregean source. The other central concern of the paper is the
relevance of scope in explaining ambiguities. Thus, for instance, Russell used
different possible scopes of the quantifier to explain he difference between de re
and de dicto understandings of ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was
the author of Waverley’. (Frege’s influence on Russell evidently waned after
1905. When he re-explained his theory of descriptions later, in the Introduction
to Principia, he did not use scope distinctions to motivate it.)
After 1911 he came under Wittgenstein’s influence and became suspicious
of his platonistic conception of logic as having a subject matter consisting of
entities such as disjunction or negation. From the autumn of 1913 onwards,
therefore, he used ‘proposition’ to mean the sentence, rather than what the
sentence expresses. In his post-war work these linguistic items were the sub-
ject matter of logic, with the result that his conception of the subject became
somewhat psychologistic.
3 Early Wittgenstein
Whereas Frege proposed a ‘one-kind, two-step’ semantics for singular terms,
Russell’s was a ‘two-kind, one-step’ theory, i.e. one that distinguished two kinds
of singular term, definite descriptions and logically proper names, and proposed
that the latter referred directly without any need for a third-realm intermediary.
It may well be that Wittgenstein at first shared Russell’s one-step conception,
and hence rejected the need for Frege’s distinction between sense and reference.
In support of this one might quote a letter Jourdain wrote to Frege in January
1914. Jourdain at that time lived on the outskirts of Cambridge and had got
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to know Wittgenstein through Russell. (For a time it was proposed that he
and Wittgenstein would collaborate on a translation into English of some parts
of Frege’s writings, but this did not occur, presumably because of the war:
when this translation eventually appeared in 1915–17 Jourdain’s collaborator
was named as Johann Stachelroth.) Jourdain wrote to ask Frege, inter alia,
‘whether, in view of what seems to be a fact, namely, that Russell has shown
that propositions can be analyzed into a form which only assumes that a name
has a ‘Bedeutung’, & and not a ‘Sinn’, you would hold that ‘Sinn’ was merely a
psychological property of a name’ [3, p. 78]. Perhaps Wittgenstein was behind
Jourdain’s question. If so, then at this time (or, at any rate, when he departed
for Norway the previous October) Wittgenstein still sided with Russell against
Frege’s sense/reference distinction.
At that time, though, Wittgenstein still hoped to devise a ‘logically perfect’
notation which would make the logical properties of a sign transparent. By
the time of the Moore dictation in April 1914, however, his search for such
a notation had stalled. He therefore began instead to stress the importance
of seeing past the ‘particular scratches’ to the symbolism’s ‘logical properties’
[9, p. 112]. Nonetheless, with no label for the distinction he was compelled to
speak opaquely of ‘seeing the sign in the sign’ [9, 23 Oct. 1914]. Not until he
had reached page 54 of the Prototractatus volume did he introduce a separate
word for what it is that we are supposed to see. Even then, his immediate
purpose in doing so was only to make a point about the ambiguity of ordinary
language, namely that one sign might represent different symbols in different
occurrences. Not until later, it seems, did he realize that even if he had, per
impossibile, found a logically perfect notation, there would still have been a role
for the distinction.
4 Sign and symbol
In the Tractatus the distinction between sign and symbol is introduced via
that between propositional sign and proposition, and this in turn emerges as a
consequence of features of the picture theory of meaning. A picture, according
to that theory, is a fact that shares its form with the part of reality that it
attempts to represent. A proposition is a picture with two extra features: first,
its form of depiction is logical; second, it is ‘expressed perceptibly through the
senses’ [10, 3.1]. These two features then give rise to the need for a distinction
between the proposition the propositional sign through which it is expressed,
since otherwise the picture theory would hold, absurdly, that we can read off
the structure of the world from the structure of the signs we use to represent it.
One might be tempted to think that by ‘propositional sign’ Wittgenstein just
meant ‘sentence’, except that this word, like ‘picture’, in ordinary usage means
a complex, whereas Wittgenstein was explicit [10, 3.14] that a propositional sign
is a fact, i.e. it is already parsed so that its grammatical structure is revealed.
So a propositional sign and a proposition are both facts, but their forms are
different: perceptible in the former case; purely logical in the latter. It is this
4
difference in form that explains why we cannot simply read off the structure
of the world from that of language. Propositions, according to the Tractatus,
share their form with the parts of the world they represent; propositional signs
do not.
Having thus distinguished between propositional sign and proposition, Wittgen-
stein distinguished analogously between their meaningful constituents, which he
called signs and symbols (or expressions) respectively. (The qualifier ‘meaning-
ful’ is needed here to rule out treating ‘es is mor’, for instance, as a sign because
it occurs in ‘Socrates is mortal’.) ‘What is essential in a symbol,’ Wittgenstein
said in the Tractatus, ‘is what all symbols that can serve the same purpose have
in common.’ [10, 3.341] In the notes dictated to Moore he was slightly more
explicit about what kind of ‘purpose’ he had in mind. ‘What symbolizes in
a symbol,’ he there wrote, ‘is that which is common to all the symbols which
could in accordance with the rules of logic . . . be substituted for it.’ [9, p. 117]
We have now arrived at the sense in which Wittgenstein’s notion of a symbol
in the Tractatus is analogous to that of conceptual content in Begriffsschrift and
sense in Grundgesetze. Wittgenstein, like Frege, wanted to focus attention on
the features of a word’s content that contributes to its logical role. ‘Seeing the
symbol in the sign’ consists in seeing past the contingent properties of a sign to
these features.
It can never indicate the common characteristic of two objects that
we symbolize them with the same signs but by different methods of
symbolizing. For the sign is arbitrary. We could therefore equally
well choose two different signs and where then would be what was
common in the symbolization? [10, 3.322]
To say that Tractarian symbols play broadly the same role as Fregean senses
is not to say that they are identical, though. Frege’s idea was that conceptual
content or sense is inferential power. The difficulty comes in how we cash this
out. If sentences have the same conceptual content only when they have the
same immediately derivable consequences, then the notion becomes too sensi-
tive to which consequences we take to be immediate. You may find obvious an
inferential step that for me requires explanation, in which case this notion has
no place in an account of logic that aspires, as Frege’s did, to be independent of
psychology. Once a formal system is in place, there will of course be an objective
criterion for the immediacy or otherwise of a deduction, but this will depend on
the system chosen and hence be unsuitable to serve, as he intended his notion
of conceptual content to serve, as part of the grounding for that very system.
Wittgenstein accused Frege of having wrongly imported psychological consider-
ations into logic. ‘It is remarkable,’ he complained, ‘that so exact a thinker as
Frege should have appealed to the degree of self-evidence as the criterion of a
logical proposition.’ [10, 6.1271] This is an instance, I think, of Wittgenstein’s
repeated tendency to take hold of an idea and apply it more resolutely than its
originator. Here he resolutely ignored psychological considerations of obvious-
ness, so that what the individual reasoner is irrelevant to ‘seeing the symbol in
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the sign’; all that matters is what is said about the world. In particular, then,
logically equivalent propositional signs express the same proposition.
5 Ramsey
Wittgenstein famously had a copy of the typescript in his possession at the
armistice, and it was this copy that he sent to Keynes in 1919 for onward
delivery to Russell. Russell left this copy with Wrinch when he departed for
China, and she eventually managed to get Ostwald to publish it as an issue of
his monograph series. An advance proof copy of this version of the book reached
Ogden in Cambridge at the beginning of November 1921 (letter to Russell, 5
Nov. 1921). It was presumably this copy that Ogden lent to Ramsey (then
a second year undergraduate) shortly thereafter and which, as his father later
recalled, ‘interested him greatly’.
These details of just when Ramsey first read the book lend an intriguing
aspect to the earliest of his philosophical essays to have survived, namely a talk
on the nature of propositions that he delivered to the Cambridge Moral Sciences
Club at the end of that November. There he proposed a multiple relation theory
of judgment which, although certainly not the same as the one in the Tractatus,
is at least similar in broad outline. What is clear, at least, is that his interest
in the Tractatus made him an obvious choice as translator. According to his
father’s memoir he dictated his draft at Miss Pate’s typing office in Trinity
Street Cambridge in March 1922. The story of how Ogden sent the resulting
typescript to Wittgenstein in Trattenbach to correct is now well known.
The book finally appeared in the dual-language edition in the autumn of
1922. Moore (who had been responsible for suggesting the Latin title by which
the English version is known) was by then Editor of Mind and commissioned
a critical notice of the book from Ramsey. He wrote this in August 1923, just
after graduating at Cambridge as what was then called a ‘B* Wrangler’ in
the Mathematical Tripos. (This meant that he got a First in Part A and a
Distinction in Part B of his final exam.) Ramsey’s critical notice was the first
serious contribution to the secondary literature on the Tractatus, and it remains
one of the best. For our purposes here what is relevant is an exegetical suggestion
he made there. From what was said above we might well be puzzled about the
nature of Tractarian symbols. To help us understand the idea, Ramsey proposed
to make use of Peirce’s terminology of type and token. This is now standard, of
course, but when Peirce proposed it in 1906, few others took much notice. Two
who did were Ogden and Richards, who quoted the relevant passage of Peirce in
their book, The Meaning of Meaning [5, pp. 433–4]. Ramsey then adopted this
terminology. Sign and symbol, he suggested, are not token and type—a sign
is already a type, as Wittgenstein’s gnomic observation that ‘ “A” is the same
sign as “A” ’ [10, 3.203] was intended to make clear—but rather two ways of
typing the tokens, whether according to syntactic properties (signs) or logical
role (symbols).
On the face of it, Ramsey’s way of putting the matter discourages us from
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hypostasizing symbols as occupants of a Fregean ‘third realm’ intermediate be-
tween language and reality. However, there are two points that tell against such
a deflationary view. First, as Ramsey also later noted (after he had discussed
the Tractatus with its author, it should be said), there may well be some types of
which there are no token instances. ‘It cannot be any concern of ours,’ he said,
‘whether anyone has actually symbolized’ it [6, p. 33]. Whether we want to say
that a type with no tokens inhabits an abstract ‘realm’ is perhaps a relatively
minor matter. Second, the transition from a propositional sign to a proposition
is not quite as straightforward as Ramsey’s exegesis suggests. It is not merely
a matter of grouping different signs together, but of changing the form of the
fact. The form of the propositional sign might be spatial (if it is written) or
temporal (if it is spoken), whereas the form of the proposition is purely logical.
So it cannot be said that Ramsey has altogether demythologized the transition.
6 Identity
Wittgenstein used the sign ‘=’ (much as Frege had used ‘≡’ in Begriffsschrift), to
stand between signs that express the same symbol. In particular, as he explained
in the Prototractatus [11, 4.2213], he used it between propositional signs that
express the same proposition. Oddly, though, he dropped this explanation from
the final version of the book, despite continuing there to use it in this way (e.g.
4.0621, 5.51, 5.52). This similarity between the Tractatus and Begriffsschrift
uses of the equality sign invites an obvious question, though. In ‘On sense
and reference’ Frege rejected the Begriffsschrift account of identity. So why
does this objection not also apply to Wittgenstein’s account in the Tractatus?
Frege’s objection was in effect that his previous account had made identities
metalinguistic. (He did not use that word, of course, which did not become
current until the 1930s.) In the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepted this.
On his account ‘=’ is a sign of the metalanguage, not the object language.
What, though, of Frege’s objection that identity sentences do sometimes
express non-trivial information? Frege’s central idea was that we need the notion
of sense in order to allow for the fact that the objects we refer to may have other
aspects of which we are currently unaware, and yet that does not prevent us
from referring to them successfully. In his draft reply to tbe letter from Jourdain
quoted earlier, Frege made this point by using the example of a mountain seen
from different directions by two explorers, one of whom names it ‘Aphla’, the
other ‘Ateb’.
What is striking here is surely the sense of two philosophers taking past each
other. Frege’s example of Aphla and Ateb certainly would not have impressed
Russell, who would have said that ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ are not logically proper
names but disguised descriptions. The place where this point surfaces in the
Tractatus is in Wittgenstein’s stipulation that in the formal language we have
no need of a sign of identity, because we can just agree never to refer to the
same object with two different simple signs. Frege’s point had been that this
stipulation is impossible to implement, because there are cases in which we do
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not yet know that the two signs do refer to the same thing. Wittgenstein’s
response was that when it comes to Tractarian objects, we do always know: a
Tractarian object, unlike Frege’s mountain, is not the kind of thing that can
have other, as yet unknown aspects to it.
I suggested earlier that it was a feature of Wittgenstein’s way of thinking to
press an idea more resolutely than its originator had done. Here we have another
instance of this. In 1914 Frege still conceived of his sense/reference distinction,
as he had when he introduced it in the 1890s, as motivated narrowly by a point
concerning identity. In this, though, he was mistaken. To see why, we need
only notice the difference in inferential power, on Frege’s conception, between
‘Hesperus is a planet’ and ‘Phosphorus is a planet’. This difference suffices
to show that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have different senses, but does not
mention identity at all. This suffices to show that Frege had mislocated the
point of the distinction. Frege thought that the distinction between sense and
reference was needed so as to leave room for objects to have unknown aspects.
On Wittgenstein’s view, the distinction is needed in order to leave room, more
generally, for the structure of our signs to differ from that of the world.
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